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Introduction
Sentencing is not an area which has received much scholarly attention from sociologists. Most of the scholarly literature has been produced by philosophers who have pursued the normative questions about how to justify punishment in a liberal society (Duff 2000, Von Hirsch 1993) or by legal scholars writing about the legal regulation of sentencing (Ashworth 2000). In the growing literature on the sociology of punishment there are only occasional references to sentencing (Garland 2001). There is a vast, mostly US, literature on sentencing as public policy (Tonry 1996). However, with a few exceptions, there has been little inquiry into the social character of sentencing.
	Little is known about the social practice of sentencing.  Sentencers in many jurisdictions enjoy wide discretion in their decision making. While every jurisdiction has complex procedural regulation which much be followed to ensure that sentences are lawful, few have rules which generate the ‘correct’ sentence from a given set of facts and circumstances. Statistical analyses of sentencing show that sentencing is patterned (Lovegrove 1989).  How are these patterns produced through the individual sentencing decisions of judges, given  the absence of rules?   How do  the courts produce an element of  consistency in sentencing when judges argue that each case is unique and that they reach sentencing decisions by a process of ‘instinctive synthesis’ (Frieberg 1995)?    
	In order to answer these and other questions it is necessary to think about how sentencing can be understood as a social practice as opposed to a legal decision or an exercise in moral philosophy. This essay reviews different approaches to understanding sentencing.  These include quantitative sociological approaches which try to analyse the impact of different factors on sentencing outcomes and interpretive sociological approaches which try to understand sentencing from the perspective of the sentencers as a form of rational social action.  The chapter argues that the work of Bourdieu, which seeks to understand the cultural and professional frameworks through which law operates, can provide a conceptual framework which is helpful for understanding the sociological distinctiveness of sentencing as a form of legal decision making.
	This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive ‘theory’ of sentencing. My starting assumption is that there is no such theory. Nor is there a single yardstick against which these approaches can be measured as being more or less accurate accounts of sentencing. Each of these approaches asks its own questions, adopts its own methodology and generates its own answers.  An understanding of these will give us a richer understanding of sentencing. This understanding may in turn help those who would like to change sentencing practices. 

A The sociology of discretion
No one would doubt that UK judges exercise discretion when choosing sentence. There are very few rules which circumscribe their choice of sentence (Hogarth 1971, Hood 1962, Ashworth 1994).  The same is true for judges in around half the states in the US (Reitz 2001) and also in many continental European jurisdictions. US judges in states which have adopted some kind of guideline system, and judges in other continental European jurisdictions still exercise discretion but the extent of this discretion varies as do the methods used to structure this discretion (Tonry and Frase 2001). 
	How can this exercise of discretion in sentencing be understood sociologically?  Most research efforts, and these have been mostly carried out in the United States, have sought to find evidence for disparity. The null hypothesis to be disproved, has been that like cases are treated alike. A serious methodological problem for this research has been ensuring that ‘like’ cases are being compared. There is no objective definition of similarity to rely upon. However, setting aside these difficulties, the results of this research effort appear to demonstrate significant inconsistencies in sentencing practice (as well as a considerable element of consistency). Given the absence of rules in sentencing, this finding is hardly unexpected. The problem could usefully be turned on its head. Instead of asking why there are inconsistencies in sentencing (answer: there are no rules), we should be asking how any consistency is achieved in the absence of rules? How do individual decision makers operating in geographically distinct courtrooms, working within local criminal justice cultures, manage collectively to produce a considerable element of consistency in their sentencing decisions? How can we explain this patterned social action?  As Hogarth (1971) noted the fundamental issues are conceptual. We cannot begin to try to measure until we have a clear idea of what it is we are trying to measure and why.

A Quantitative analysis
B Modelling the sentencing process
One important way of understanding patterns in sentencing is to look at aggregate sentencing figures and use statistical tools to analyse the patterns that emerge from these. The analysis looks for factors and/or combinations of factors which appear to predict sentencing outcomes with some degree of accuracy. Thus for example, if one possessed certain information about an offence and about the criminal history of the offender, one could use these analyses to help predict the sentence that would be passed in a particular court. The most elaborate form of such analyses would produce a ‘model’ of sentencing which would take into account a wide range of relevant factors and measure the effect which these have on sentencing outcomes. Perhaps the most rigorous and comprehensive attempt to produce a model of sentencing is described in a book published in 1989 by Austin Lovegrove.  His central argument is that multivariate statistical analysis reveals:

the factors determinative of sentence and their relative importance averaged across the data  base of cases (Lovegrove1989: 47). 

	His analysis shows that two factors, case seriousness and criminal history, are the best predictors of sentencing outcome. Beyond these two factors, others have much smaller and much less accurately predictable effects on outcome. Nevertheless, Lovegrove’s argument is that with more sophisticated conceptual clarification and more comprehensive data collection, a more accurate model of sentencing could be produced.
	Lovegrove’s use of the term ‘determinative’ raises the issue of causality. The question is whether Lovegrove intends a ‘strong’ sense of causality, in the sense drawn from natural science methodology. This implies that his model is able to formulate laws of sentencing behaviour which allow reliable prediction. This of course raises the question of how these laws operate and whether they operate independently of any active decision making processes exercised by judges.  
	A weaker sense of causality would suggest that the factors play a causal role alongside other factors in producing the outcome.  This is important for Lovegrove’s analysis because he wants to argue that these tools of statistical analysis can be used to predict outcomes from factors. The existence of a statistical correlation between a small number of case factors and sentence outcome does not imply that the former cause the latter. The correlations simply identify the most significant factors governing sentencing. It is hardly surprising that the seriousness of the offence and the criminal record of the offender are the two best predictors of sentence outcome. Taken together, these two factors are likely to narrow down the range of sentencing options very significantly in the vast majority of cases. However, Lovegrove’s work does not provide the accurate predictive power that would be necessary for a robust ‘model’ of sentencing.
	Lovegrove’s detailed and thorough work has identified patterns of sentencing behaviour. The problem is that this search is based on an unexamined assumption that sentencing is rational and that if one looks hard enough, a model of sentencing can be discovered. This confuses patterns with rationality. The fact that there is a pattern does not imply that there is necessarily a rational model of sentencing being operated unconsciously by sentencers. From an interpretive perspective, sentencers are social actors.  They reflexively perceive themselves as making decisions and making choices, albeit within certain boundaries. Scholars working from an interpretive paradigm would argue that these patterns are constructed because judges are reproducing structures of professional knowledge/practice learnt through experience. So in order to understand these patterns, we need to investigate the social conditions of sentencing. What are judges trying to achieve? What are the constraints under which they operate? How are their choices made?
	Nevertheless, Lovegrove’s argument is that these statistical patterns reveal what he calls ‘applied’ sentencing policy.  Even if judges are not able to articulate a sentencing policy, what they actually do in practice constitutes a de facto sentencing policy.  One can accept that sentencing policy is ‘what judges do’ but this does not entail accepting that what judges do is therefore systematic or  consistent.

B The classification and measurement of seriousness
Kathleen Daly (1994) points to another limitation of quantitative approaches to the study of sentencing. This concerns the methods used to classify the variables being counted. Lovegrove’s work attempts to discover the extent to which each of a number of variables affects the sentencing outcome in a case. Much of the research into sentencing disparity aims to collect a sample of similar cases and examine the extent to which sentencing outcomes are divergent. In order to do this, categories have to be developed to define what similarity means.[1] However, all of these approaches share the need to develop categories into which ‘real’ cases can be sorted. As Tamanaha puts it, 

positivism gets off the ground by placing phenomena into categories and then quantifying them’ (1997: 62).

	In sentencing research, the central problem concerns how to design categories which accurately reflect  case ‘seriousness’.  From the perspective of Lovegrove, the problem is to develop a list of those factors which affect seriousness. These can then be counted and regression analysis applied to measure their relative effect on sentence outcome. Disparity research is concerned to design ‘boxes’ which contain cases of similar seriousness so that sentencing outcomes can be compared for similar cases. The problem is defining  how the contents of one box differ from the contents of the next box: How does one ‘level’ or ‘type’ of robbery differ in seriousness from another? This is essentially the same problem for those designing sentencing guidelines (Tonry 1996) or information systems (Tata et al. 1996).
	Daly argues that there are an enormous number of factors which may legitimately be taken into account by a sentencer in assessing the seriousness of a case. For example, the age of the victim, the nature and extent of the harm caused to the victim, the value of property stolen or damaged, the extent of planning involved, the use of a weapon, the criminal record of the offender, the age of the offender, and so on. Philosophical monographs have been written on how to assess seriousness (Feinberg 1988). The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines have developed a  software programme which calculates a seriousness score for each case taking into account a formidable range of data (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2004).  European jurisdictions have narrative descriptions of the factors which affect seriousness written into sentencing legislation (for Sweden, see von Hirsch and Jareborg 1991; for Italy, see Mannozzi 2002). In England and Wales, David Thomas compiles a huge loose leaf compendium which can be read as a sprawling jurisprudence of how judges in that jurisdiction have assessed seriousness (Thomas 1999). Morrison has produced a similar encyclopaedia for Scotland (Morrison 2000). More recently in England and Wales, the Sentencing Guidelines Council have issued Final guidelines on the Overarching Principles of Seriousness (http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk)
	There are a very large number of factors which may be legitimately be taken into account in assessing seriousness. There is considerable disagreement internationally about what these factors are and how they should be taken into account. Some jurisdictions such as England and Wales allow judges considerable discretion in assessing seriousness. At the other extreme the Federal Sentencing Guidelines produced by the US Sentencing Commission, have effectively produced an objective definition of seriousness by limiting the range of factors which can be taken into account and quantifying the effect on sentence of these factors. Stith and Cabranes (1998) argue that the Guidelines have produced injustice by treating as uniform cases which are different. They also argue that many judges and academic commentators are unhappy with the guidelines because the quantitative approach to seriousness fails to take into account important and relevant factors. 
	A further problem is that in defining categories, there is an assumption that factors relevant to seriousness have the same significance in every context.  However this is not necessarily the case. For example, the age of an offender may be a factor which reduces seriousness in some contexts but makes no difference in other contexts. The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines give considerable weight in the calculation of sentence to the quantity of the drug involved, but much less weight to the extent of involvement of the offender in the business of trafficking the drug. This fixes the significance of drug weight and extent of involvement. Judges, however, argue that in some cases, the extent of involvement is a more important factor in assessing seriousness than the quantity of the drug. The guidelines do not permit this perception to be reflected in the sentence (Stith and Cabranes 1998:120).
	The problem is that seriousness resists efforts to capture its significance in a purely objective manner. There are so many factors involved and their meaning is so slippery that it is impossible to produce an objective, unambiguous, non-contestable definition.  However, in practice, judges make decisions about the relative seriousness of cases every day.  It is an unavoidable part of the social practice of sentencing which has real impacts on the lives of sentenced offenders, victims and their families
	One conclusion from this might be that if seriousness cannot be captured objectively, then there is no point in trying to capture it at all. However, if the assumption of the value of pure objectivity is dropped, this conclusion also disappears. It is difficult to capture seriousness and our ways of trying to do so may have no absolute and objective basis. Nevertheless, it is something which judges do everyday, and in our liberal ideals of justice, we give a high value to the aim of treating like cases in a like manner, so we are obliged to find a way of assessing seriousness which we think most helpful to us in pursuing our (unattainable) ideals. 
	Any categorisation of seriousness takes its significance from the meaning used by sentencers themselves, i.e. meaning is contingent on context and not independent of it (Tamanaha 1997: 70).  In other words, when we say that the patterns of sentencing show that case seriousness and  criminal record are the best predictors of sentencing outcome, we are not saying that these are the ‘real’ causes of sentencing outcomes, all we are saying is these seem to be very important factors influencing the outcomes of the social processes of sentencing. 
	The strength of quantitative studies such as those conducted by Lovegrove is that they demonstrate the existence of patterns in sentencing. The main limitation of this work is that it cannot describe how these patterns are produced beyond the important knowledge that two factors, case seriousness and criminal history, make a significant impact. Lovegrove admits that his analysis does not shed light on the judges’  ‘decision strategy’ for combining case facts. In other words, while the statistical analysis might show patterns of sentencing, it does not help us to understand how these patterns are produced by judges.
	In the absence of many rules specifying which factors are to be taken into account, how these are to be measured and weighed against each other and how the resultant ‘score’ translates into a specific type and amount of punishment, we do not know how judges produce these patterns of sentencing. This is the question that interpretive approaches to sentencing have addressed.

 …[W]e need to see logico-scientific and narrative modes of reasoning as poles from which we can glimpse distinctive representational possibilities. In so doing we can think more systematically about narrative and more meaningfully about numbers (Daly 1994: 265).

A Interpretive analyses
Lovegrove’s work demonstrates that there is a considerable element of consistency in sentencing and goes some way to describing the contours of this consistency. The main weakness of his approach is that it does not address the question of how this consistency is produced. Lovegrove seems to be uninterested in the judge as a self-conscious and reflective social actor who is actively engaged in constructing sentencing decisions. These are the concerns of those working  in the interpretive tradition in sociology who see the social world as an active production of social action. As Tamanaha puts it,

There are regularities in behaviour because people in a community who are similarly socialized often have shared ideas, beliefs and reasoning patterns and operate under similar constraining conditions…’ (1997: 68).

B The social field of sentencing
The sociological method of Pierre Bourdieu was intended to avoid what he saw as the false split between subjective and objective approaches in conventional sociological analysis.  
	A subjective approach draws attention to the ways in which agents perceive themselves as active subjects. It suggests that the social world is an active and ongoing accomplishment of social actors engaged in social practices.  An objective approach draws attention to the patterned nature of social life, to the social structures which are reproduced in the social actions of agents. 
	Agents may think they are employing ‘sign systems’ but the social world and agency itself is produced by these sign systems. ‘Social reality’ is produced by the sign systems which we have at our disposal. Meaning is contingent, an idea or object in a sign system only has meaning in relation to other elements of that sign system.
	An objective approach can discover the patterns in social life, but  cannot explain how these patterns are produced  nor how they are transformed. It cannot account for the experience and perceptions agents have of themselves as active, conscious, decision makers.
	From Bourdieu’s perspective, sentencing decisions can be seen as social actions generated in the social field of sentencing. Bourdieu defines a social field as:

Interaction between institutions, rules and practices, rituals, designations, conventions, appointments and titles which produce and authorize certain discourses and activities (1977: 21-22).

	Hawkins (2003) uses a different conceptual framework to understand the social context for discretionary decision making in law. His concepts of ‘surround’ and ‘field’ arguably serve similar functions to Bourdieu’s concept of social field.  These are the ‘external’ conditions which shape the exercise of discretion. 
	These include, the broader cultural and political climate of punishment,  the representations of sentencing and punishment in the local and national media and judicial perceptions and responses to these, the judicial profession and the system of  judicial appointments, the position of sentencing in the series of criminal justice process decisions about cases, the rules governing sentencing, the shared understandings of  what constitutes a defensible sentencing decision and the modes of argumentation which can be brought to bear to justify these decisions if required. Of course, this field shares much in common with the much broader social field of law, however sentencing is a distinctive sub-field.
	How do these factors generate sentencing practices? Bourdieu uses the concept of ‘habitus’ to account for the ways in which structural conditions generate social practices. Hawkins uses the concept of ‘framing’ to understand the processes of interpretation, classification and justification employed by  legal professionals in the exercise of discretion to produce outcomes which are patterned and display an element of consistency.

B Habitus
Habitus is ‘the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations which produce practices’ (Bourdieu 1977: 78, quoted in Webb et al. 2002: 36).  Sentencers, like almost all social actors, take their social world for granted. ‘[H]e feels at home in the world because the world is also in him’ (Bourdieu 2000: 142-3, quoted in Webb et al. 2002: 25).  Webb et al. describe habitus as a ‘feel for the game’ (2002: 38). This sits easily with sentencers’ own perceptions of sentencing as intuitive and artful (Ashworth 1984).  Bourdieu’s intention is, however not to take habitus for granted, but to examine it in context and describe its elements and properties. Habitus is neither natural nor inevitable, but the product of particular social, cultural and political conditions. It is contingent on these conditions and not essential or transcendent. Habitus is unthinking and unreflective. It can change but is likely to do so slowly in most circumstances. 
	Judges’ sentencing behaviour is patterned because through their education and working experience they have learnt how to think, argue, and make decisions in a judicial way and because they work within the same criminal justice institutions. These social factors both enable sentencing decisions to be made and at the same time set limits on these decisions. Judges have a limited repertoire from which to draw in making their sentencing decisions, but this repertoire can be drawn upon in varied and sometimes novel ways.  There is scope for different judges to make different interpretations or evaluations of the same facts.  This means that although sentencing is patterned, the pattern is far from uniform, and inconsistencies are found alongside the consistencies. Patterns can and do change. For example, the sentencing of rape and child sexual abuse has changed over the last twenty years as public conceptions and moral evaluations of these offences have changed and, through some means, judges sentencing practices have changed in response to these broader social changes in attitudes.
	Social actors think and act strategically.  Social practice is improvised and strategic, not behaviour governed by rules. Actors try to use the rules of the game to their advantage. At the same time they are influenced and almost driven by the values and expectations they get from the habitus. They may be conscious of acting strategically but they are unaware that their motives, goals and aspirations are not spontaneous or natural but are given to them through the habitus. 

 …[T]he power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather  than consciously learned rules and principles. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge and without the actors necessarily ‘knowing’ what they are  doing (Jenkins 1992: 76).

	In the context of sentencing, sentencers think that they choose the right sentence. This is done intuitively rather than according to a set of rules.  When asked to account for their decision, they do so by reciting facts and circumstances but without explicitly or logically relating these to a calculus of sanctions. Sentencers perceive themselves to be making complex, difficult and sensitive decisions. They do so by drawing on their experience and professional knowledge but they find it difficult to articulate the elements of these competences.
Judges, we believed, organized their thinking about sentencing not in terms of a series of abstractions but as a series of reactions to particular cases (Wheeler, Mann and Sarat 1988: 4; see also Tata 1997)

	Using Bourdieu’s conceptual approach, sentencing decisions emerge  from the habitus, the unthinking common sense approach that becomes second nature to experienced judges.  From their position within the unreflective habitus, judges, can conceive of no other way of making a decision. But what appears to be ‘common sense’ to them is, for Bourdieu, a socially constructed set of values, motives, methods of analysis, judgemental criteria, assumptions, classifications and categories which are distinctively the conditions of existence of judges. Take, for example, the judicial perception that offenders who use drugs, have criminal records, chaotic lifestyles, no homes, no jobs, and no appropriate personal relationships etc are not suitable for community sanctions. This is not inevitable or natural but produced by a discourse which distinguishes between ‘real’ criminals and ‘respectable’ people who have made mistakes. Social conditions such as poverty, disadvantage, lack of opportunities and low social capital which generate persistent young male offenders are translated into the ‘sentencing problem’ of selecting a sanction which is appropriate for the case at hand. 
	While the concept of ‘habitus’ is helpful for understanding the ways in which the taken for granted everyday world is unreflectively produced by social actors, the concept has its limitations. De Certeau (1984) criticizes Bourdieu for taking an overdeterministic view of habitus. He argues that agents are more able to reflect on their positions and more culturally literate than Bourdieu allows. Resistance can be almost or completely invisible and take unexpected forms. This is just to argue that habitus is neither completely determining nor completely fixed. Bourdieu sometimes appears to be too deterministic but there may be empirical conditions in which habitus is highly constricting and very difficult to change. Sentencing is an example of a social field where,  despite the wide discretion, the opportunities for radical difference are very limited.

B Elements of the habitus of sentencing

C Populist punitiveness
Commentators have argued that the rise in the prison population which has occurred in many Western jurisdictions over the last twenty years can be at least partly explained by changes in sentencing practice (see also, Downes and Hansen, this volume). Judges appear to be sending more offenders to prison and also sending offenders to prison for longer (Millie, Jacobson and Hough 2003). Unfortunately there is little research which helps to understand the mechanisms through which this apparent ‘punitiveness’ changes sentencing practices. The evidence cited for punitiveness is made up of  examples of political rhetoric such as ‘three strikes’ or ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’, legislation providing mandatory minimum sentences or anti-social behaviour (Ashworth 2002), and analysis of the representations of crime and punishment in the popular and quality press.  Is it true that this punitiveness has had an impact on sentencing practice and if so how has this happened?  Garland has argued that this punitiveness has been accompanied by a more rational managerial approach to criminal justice ‘on the ground’, which proceeds without much media attention.  In the UK at least, sentencing has largely escaped the managerialism that has transformed other parts of the criminal justice process, e.g. policing, prosecution, prisons, criminal justice social work. How has sentencing escaped and what does this tell us about the social practice of sentencing?

C Sentencing and the criminal justice process.
Sentencers make decisions about cases which have already been constructed by the work of other agencies and the discretionary decision making of other criminal justice professionals (Hawkins 2003).  Their sentencing options are to some extent constrained by decisions made by prosecutors, or negotiated between prosecutors and defence agents, and by reports prepared for the court by probation officials, social workers and other professionals. Sentencers will also anticipate the way their decision will be interpreted by others, most notably the Court of Appeal, but also by the offenders, the victims and their families, and the local and national media. Local court cultures will also generate conditions which affect sentencing decisions. In smaller courts, shared understandings develop which provide an informal and tacit resource for sentencing decisions.

C The judicial profession and legal culture
Judges, at least in the UK,  are drawn from a relatively narrow field. Until recently there were no formal appointment procedures, effectively judges selected themselves.  They are likely to have been immersed in a rather narrow section of the legal world for their professional lives. They will have undergone minimal training and professional development in criminal sentencing, and that will have been provided internally by the profession and will have been unlikely to challenge their habits of thought. 
 	I argue below that sentencing presents judges with a problem.  Lawyers are trained to analyse facts, find relevant rules, and apply these rules to facts to produce justifiable decisions. Sentencing is different. There are very few rules. How do judges respond to this problem?  They do so, I argue, in a way which shares much in common with David Robertson’s analysis (1998) of the House of Lords decision making in ‘hard’ appeal cases. In my view this shows how a broader legal culture permeates and underpins judicial decision making. This helps to understand why UK judges are so resistant to attempts to make sentencing more systematic , rational and arguably more legal.

B Capital
Bourdieu’s sociology recognizes the significance of  power in social relationships. Power is associated with the possession of  ‘capital’. This can be economic, social, cultural or symbolic. Judges have very high levels of all kinds of capital.  They are well paid and economically secure. They exercise considerable power and control over their own practices and meanings. Their sentencing decisions are relatively autonomous and not subject to the accounting practices of others beyond their colleagues in the Court of Appeal. They have successfully avoided political interference with sentencing, most notably in the contribution of judges in England and Wales  to the criticism of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.  This law attempted to introduce a desert based approach to sentencing in England and Wales and subsequently led to passage of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act.  Lawyers have a monopoly over official legal knowledge and method and they therefore have an interest in preserving this intellectual capital.  Judges wish to protect their control of sentencing when they perceive their authority being challenged by ‘outsiders’.  
	Cotterrell (1992) argues that because the UK has no constitution, judges derive their authority from their status. In Weber’s terms, their authority is charismatic, based on public perceptions of their political neutrality, experience and wisdom. Judicial adherence to a pragmatic approach to decision making promotes the perception of judicial wisdom being ‘special’. They eschew principles and theory and  avoid anything which looks like policy making. Sentencing is done on a case by case basis with little reference to principles and no recognition of the existence of any sentencing ‘policy’. 
	Their cultural or symbolic capital derives from their charismatic authority. This aspect of judicial power is perhaps least settled.  Survey evidence suggests that the public have limited confidence in the courts, and think that judges are too old and out of touch. There may be a connection between the anachronistic mode of decision making used in sentencing and public perceptions of the judiciary as being ‘out of touch’. 
	Any programme of sentencing reform will involve a political struggle over the distribution of capital within the social field of sentencing. Judges will try to retain as much capital as they can while those who want to transform sentencing will need to obtain capital to allow change to occur. 

B Psychological approaches
An interpretive approach can focus on a wide range of contextual factors which have an impact on sentencing. John Hogarth set out to try to understand sentencing from the point of view of magistrates. To that extent his approach is interpretive. However he also tried to measure the impact of specific factors on sentencing outcomes. These factors are analysed in the context of the other factors. Thus he is less concerned with measuring the independent effects of factors such as age, political affiliation, penal philosophy, and so on, than with demonstrating how constellations of factors ‘fit together’. He uses quantitative methods and statistical analyses but only to support an interpretive picture of how these magistrates operate.
	Hogarth’s judges adhered to all of the classical justifications of punishment: reformation, general then individual deterrence, incapacitation and punishment. Nearly all claimed to seek to prevent crime. There was however a marked inconsistency in their adherence to these principles.  For example, a judge may place a high value on reformation but admit that it is not feasible in many cases. The majority of the magistrates believed in the efficacy of the penal measures they apply. Hogarth argues that this is psychologically necessary. Belief in reformation (as opposed to belief in the other penal philosophies) is associated with belief in efficacy of most penal measures. Hogarth explains this by arguing that judges interpret information in accordance with their beliefs to maximize internal consistency. Where judges conceive of offenders as in need of treatment, they perceive prisons to be places where they will get treatment, conveniently setting aside the high rates of recidivism that they may have heard about. This theory is based on cognition research which shows that people arrange elements of their cognitive system to avoid inconsistency. Carlen’s work on Scottish Sheriffs confirms this finding. Judges sent women offenders to prison because they felt that prison was the best place for women to receive medical attention, pre-natal care, drug or alcohol treatment, and other services, whether or not the prison was in fact able to provide these sorts of treatment (Carlen 1983).
	Hogarth found that magistrates perceived themselves as being guided by rules of thumb, such as presumptions for or against probation or for or against imprisonment for cases of different kinds. Seriousness of the offence was felt to be the primary factor leading to custody but magistrates varied in their assessment of seriousness. These decision making rules of thumb are closely related to the beliefs and attitudes of the sentencer. This is apparent not only in their post facto justifications but also in their actual behaviour. ‘It seems that justice is a very personal thing’  (Hogarth 1971: 82).
	Hogarth concluded that judges’ beliefs and attitudes had an effect on their sentencing. For example, judges who believed in rehabilitation restricted their use of custody to high risk individuals (Hogarth 1971: 81,  Fitzmaurice and Pease 1981). This is not to argue that psychological traits determine sentencing practices. Within the broader social practices of sentencing, variations can be produced by psychological forces.

A How do judges construct their decisions?
In an article about the psychology of sentencing Austin Lovegrove argues that sentencers should be supported by a computerized database which contains both statistical information about past sentencing practices and also a statement of sentencing policy, that is the principles which judges use to analyse these facts and reach a just  choice of sentence. Lovegrove argues that the database:
 
must include a record of the content and sequence of judges’ thoughts as they use case facts to determine sentence-how they construe and interrelate the case facts and the concepts they draw on to do this (Lovegrove 1999: 35).

	This raises important questions:
	1. Is this an accurate account of the practice of sentencing? This may represent an idealized view of how an uber-rational judge might set about providing a justification for a sentencing decision under the system which Lovegrove proposes but there is no evidence that this is an accurate representation of  judicial sentencing processes.
	2. How would we go about obtaining such a representation? Asking a judge to verbalize his thought processes may not produce an account of how judges make sentencing decisions but an account of how judges respond to the request of a researcher to verbalize their sentencing. These are not the same sort of account. Judges’ public accounts of their sentencing decision making will be different from accounts which they may agree to share anonymously with a researcher and again from accounts which they may share with their colleagues in private (see Tata 2002a). 
	The search for a ‘real’ account is mistaken. The choice of a methodology for producing knowledge depends not on a test for objective accuracy but on the purposes for which this knowledge is required, and an assessment of the most valid and reliable way of acquiring this knowledge.
	This is really a debate about social science methodology. We need to develop methodological protocols for collecting data in a world where we no longer have faith in any ‘pure’ theory of objective or value neutral knowledge. The alternative is not pure relativism, but some kind of pragmatism which makes clear the methods used to acquire knowledge and the value assumptions underpinning these. 
	We should let go of the idea that we can ‘know’ how sentencing decisions are made or that there is a consistent systematic policy waiting to be uncovered by painstaking scientific research.  Instead we should start from what we want to do about and with sentencing  (for example, make it more rational, more accountable or more transparent) and ask what we need to find out to allow us to achieve this goal within the limitations outlined above.  This is in fact what Lovegrove wants to do, to use judges’ reasoning and statistical analysis of case facts to help judges to build a normative policy which can be articulated. The difference between Lovegrove’s approach and the approach sketched out in this essay is that the approach sketched here is a political choice, not an objective description.

B An interpretive analysis of decision making
Decision making is a part of routine professional practice. It is what judges do every day and what most of them have been doing for many years. Most routine sentencing decisions have to be made quickly with little time for reflection (Hogarth 1971: Ch. 5). The decision comes first. In all but the hardest cases ( and we need to know more about what constitutes a hard case for sentencing) judges ‘know’ what the right decision is, call this  ‘instinctive synthesis’ (Freiberg 1995) or whatever you like. If required to justify this decision, post facto arguments can be constructed. (This is a form of realist argument). For most routine sentencing decisions in UK jurisdictions at least, judges are not required to justify their decisions in any formal sense. Most will say something from the bench, particularly where the offenders, victim or victim’s family are present, but they are only required to provide a written version of their decision when their decision is appealed, a rare occurrence for most judges.  In Scotland, only the Court of Appeal routinely produces public justifications for its decisions. 
	The important point here is that the decision comes first and the judges work backwards to construct a post hoc justification and to demonstrate that the sentence ‘fits’ the case.  Thus an understanding of sentencing from this perspective is an understanding of the range of legitimate accounts which judges can construct to justify their sentence.  This is not an explanation of how a sentence was reached, but of how a plausible account was constructed (Tata 2002b). This speculative theory is intended to refer to the sentencing practices of Scottish sheriffs sentencing criminal cases at first instance. However the analogy is drawn  from Robertson’s analysis of the decision making of the House of Lords, the highest court in the UK. Robertson (1998) argues that his analysis can be applied to a much wider universe of decision making by public officials who make rule-bounded discretionary decisions. 
	Robertson defines discretion as the requirement of judges (in his case, House of Lords judges) to make a decision about what rule is relevant when there is ‘no institutional way that they can be forced to make one rather than another decision’ (Robertson 1998: 9).
	Robertson argues  that  the exercise of judicial discretion in these ‘hard cases’ is a choice which is not ‘entailed or enforced’ by anything in law: 

What we are insisting on is that any case that comes to the House of Lords could be decided either way, and that judges do fully choose the way it will come out, with no important limitations other than those involved in the need to get at least two other Law Lords to agree with them (1998: 13)

	His view is that judges make the decision which they think is ‘right’ and then deploy argumentation to justify this decision. The decision is not determined by law, it is a choice made by judges. 
	What relevance does this argument have for an understanding of sentencing?  Discretion is the exercise of choice about which rule is relevant where there is no institutional means of forcing them to make one choice rather than another. If we set aside the very extensive procedural regulation of sentencing, which is usually described as sentencing law, there are few rules governing choice of sentence. Discretion in sentencing then is not about deciding which rule is relevant. There are no rules. Moving to the second part. The only institutional check on sentencing decisions is the appeal process.  Sentences are only likely to be overturned if they are manifestly unjust or out of line. The Appeal Court mostly describes broad boundaries of acceptability and only in guideline judgements in England and Wales attempts anything more akin to fine tuning.
	Sentencing decisions then are even more discretionary (i.e. even less rule bound) than the House of Lords decisions which Robertson analyses. They are thus even more nakedly expressions of value preference or freely exercised choice which are not at all determined by law. In fact one might go so far as to say that they are hardly recognisable as legal decisions at all which is the point made by Judge Frankel thirty years ago (Frankel1972). Ashworth argues that judicial arguments defending ‘independence’ in sentencing amount to little more than assertions of ownership of sentencing (Ashworth 1999). 
	To pursue this point further it is helpful to examine the way in which judges attempt to justify their sentencing decisions.  Take, for example,  is the reported decisions of the Court of Appeal in Scotland  in appeals against sentence. A typical judgement recites the facts and circumstances of the case to display that they have been ‘taken into account’.  The Court then states an opinion as to whether the original sentence was within the appropriate boundaries or not.  Occasionally, the Court will make reference to past cases. Even more rarely, there may be some rehearsal of  one or more of the conventional aims of sentencing. However the judgement never articulates the nature of the relationship between the amount of penalty and the facts and circumstances of the case. ‘Instinctive synthesis’ is the term coined in a notable Australian judgement to describe how a judgment generates a quantum of sanction from a given set of facts and circumstances (Freiberg 1995).

B Sentencing as a Legal Decision
Robertson (1998) argues that the House of Lords judges are socialized into the very small world of courtroom practitioner lawyers. Since graduation (from a limited number of institutions) they have worked and lived together, fought each other in court and judged each other for over thirty years. It is not their class position which influences their decision making so much as their membership of this small and relatively closed  social group. They learn what it is to make a judicial decision through the development of the skills of advocacy. They operate as individuals and have little experience of working as members of a team, unlike solicitors working in practice. They are also accustomed to generating arguments for either side of a case and Robertson argues that this facility is transferred, inappropriately, to their duties when they become judges. Robertson argues that their approach to judging is based on a view of what law is supposed to do, sociologists might describe this as the social function of law.  Functionalist sociologists might describe this as conflict resolution; civil libertarians might describe law’s function as the protection of rights.  Roberston argues that his research suggests that House of Lords judges see themselves as problem solvers.  His research shows that judges seek a decision that will ‘work’. They operate with a tacit ‘pragmatic utilitarianism’  which Robertson says fits well with Hart’s analysis in The Concept of Law (Robertson 1998: 20). Of course ‘making things work’, whether this is fine-tuning welfare state institutions or ‘deciding cases according to commercial common sense’ cannot be achieved without making value judgements. Robertson’s data does not show any particular ideological underpinning, apart from a tendency to behave much like other senior public administrators. He lists the following characteristics of the ‘Whitehall view’ or the British generalist civil service culture and argues that these characterize the exercise of judicial discretion by House of Lords judges, for whom ‘all relevant matters are considered and no irrelevant matters taken into account’; ‘decisions are as limited as possible, as consistent with past decisions as possible, as bereft as possible of implications for future decisions’; ‘recommendations are justified by comparisons and analogies from the immediate experiences of the decision makers, and the whole matter is treated with virtually no reference to overarching norms or guiding principles’ (Robertson 1998: 399). It is administration on a case by case basis, heavily dependent on deference to experience on similar committees rather than expertise on the technical matters discussed. 
	Many aspects of this analysis can be applied to sentencing. Appeal judgements list all factors which should be taken into account, and there is no reference to overarching norms or guideline principles. Sentencer’s reports prepared for the Appeal Court thus consist of a list of all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case but rarely refer to any principles or rules which were ‘applied’ to these facts to derive a sentencing decision. From a judicial perspective, sentencing works on a case by case basis. In that sense the decision is limited in that it is limited to the case at hand and, unless it is a guideline judgement of the Appeal Court, it has very limited implications for future practice, because judges pay little attention to past sentencing patterns and have no access to accurate information about these practices in any case. There is virtually no reference to anything which might be described as ‘technical’ evidence, for example about past sentencing practice, about the effectiveness of punishment or about the costs and benefits of sentencing policy.  Furthermore, there is little reliance on past practice nor any systematic attempt to be consistent. 
	Consistency however is an important value in sentencing. All judges would accept that it is an important aim of justice that like cases be treated alike. Where does consistency appear in sentencing judgements?  Judges do not refer to data about the past sentencing practices of the court (Doob 1990), they only occasionally refer to other decided cases (following precedent in sentencing is quite different from the procedure in civil law). Consistency is alluded to rather than explicitly evoked. Judgements list the relevant factors of a case. On the one hand these factors characterize the case as an individual case, distinctive from other cases, on the other hand some of these features are obviously shared with other cases. Judges do not articulate what makes the case the same and what makes it different. They do not attempt to explain these features to a public audience. Why not?
	Firstly, they do not do it because there is no formal requirement for them to do so.  However, more importantly, it is an impossible task because there is no systematic structure to which they can refer for help. Their sentencing decision making cannot be explained because there is literally no language which can be used to express it other than the language they use in their judgements. This is something that is part of their professional knowledge. Members of their profession share this knowledge and so there is no need to articulate it in another form. The language of the judgement is the way in which judges communicate with one another. It conveys the information which is necessary to account for their decision to the only institution which matters, the Appeal Court. If the judgement is an Appeal Court judgement - there is no higher institution which matters - the Appeal Court is communicating effectively with the profession.
	Judges are not explicit about consistency because there is no mechanism to allow them to do this. The structures within which they work do not provide a means of talking about consistency in a legally relevant way. Consistency is an overarching norm or principle and judges are uncomfortable with these. This may partly explain the discomfort felt by the English judiciary with the principle of proportionality underpinning the 1991 Criminal Justice Act. This attempted to impose a principled approach to sentencing which is alien to the English tradition of individualized pragmatic sentencing. 
	The silence about consistency, which can also be understood as a silence about how to assign similarity and difference to cases, is produced by the general individualized, ad hoc, case by case, approach to sentencing, which is characteristic not only of sentencing but of a much wider approach to the exercise of discretion by judges. This is part of the habitus of sentencing.
	This helps to explain why sentencing has long been regarded as unworthy of scholarly legal attention. The lack of systematic concern for precedent has made the field infertile ground for scholars who want to describe a jurisprudence of sentencing based on an analysis of sentencing decisions. The major works of scholarship in England and Wales and Scotland are encyclopaedias which contain descriptions of the decisions in many cases but which fail to identify any systematic guiding principles (Thomas 1999, Morrison 2000). In civil law scholarship, a common aim of a scholarly text is to accurately describe the law as a relatively closed field; it provides a text to which practitioners can refer to find answers to their problems. This has never really worked in sentencing because there are no rules which can be identified, interpreted, extrapolated, and applied to factual situations.  The best that practitioners can hope for is to find a case in the encyclopaedia which shares ‘sufficiently similar facts’ to be offered as a guide for sentencers.  The texts do not provide anything resembling a definition of what ‘sufficiently similar facts’ might be. 
	Sentencing does not really provide much for scholarly lawyers to get their teeth into. The kinds of elegant, subtle and elaborate argument that one finds in civil judgements do not exist in sentencing because of the almost complete absence of rules.

A Conclusion: implications for sentencing reform
This essay has suggested that a range of research techniques are required to understand how sentencing operates as a social practice. These range from an examination of statistical patterns of sentencing, reading and listening to judicial accounts of sentencing, and an analysis of sentencing as a form of legal decision making. None of these on their own allows us to provide a ‘grand theory’ of sentencing, nor to build a robust model of sentencing that would enable us to predict sentencing decisions accurately. They can however provide an account which helps us to understand the social practice of sentencing and which might help to understand the obstacles to reform of sentencing as well as the mode of reform which has the best chance of working in practice.
	Sentencing decisions are not generated by the application of legal rules but through the routine, largely unreflective, day to day practices of judges working in a distinctive legal culture and in a local court environment. Habitus offers a useful shorthand term for these processes.
	Judicial accounts of sentencing typically relate a narrative of facts and circumstances, from which a sentence emerges through an intuitive process. This discourse of individualized sentencing allows cases to be distinguished from each other as there are an almost limitless range of relevant factors which can be taken into account and no rules which set out how with any precision how these factors should affect the calculation of sentence.  This discourse recognizes the value of consistency in sentencing, but provides an almost limitless range of ways in which one case can be distinguished from another which effectively means that no rational consideration of consistency is possible.
	Most attempts to reform sentencing are efforts to inject a more rational approach to consistency. Where judges resist reform they do so not just to defend their power and social capital, not just because they perceive the reform to threaten the pursuit of justice but also because the reform attempts represent an alien way of thinking about sentencing. The different approaches to reform, narrative guidelines, numerical guidelines or sentencing information systems, all  attempt to provide a language for addressing the issue of consistency in sentencing. The discourse of individualized sentencing has no such language and is silent on the issue of consistency. Sentencing reform thus needs to challenge the habitus of sentencing. Reformers need to find ways of convincing judges that there is an alternative to individualized sentencing. Inspiration may be sought from judges in the twenty or so US jurisdictions where guidelines operate (Reitz 2001). In most of these jurisdictions, judges exercise discretion within the context of the guidelines and do not feel that their independence or professional judgement is thereby threatened. 
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